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to-do list for libxcrypt ------------------------ * Near future: * Update all of the default cost parameters * relevant benchmarking at <https://pthree.org/2016/06/28/lets-talk-password-hashing/> * the default used by `crypt_gensalt_*` for new hashes should be controllable independently from the default used if there is no rounds= annotation in a setting string * Make the crypt and crypt_gensalt static state thread-specific? * if allocated on first use, this would also shave 32kB of data segment off the shared library * Factor out all of the repetitive base64 code * get rid of the de/serialization code in crypt-bcrypt.c that still does dodgy things with type punning * Attempt to determine the copyright holders and intended licensing of the test suite * Moar tests * Make sure the symbol versioning macros work with all of the compilers that anyone needs (they use GCC extensions that clang also supports). * Longer term: * Hash algorithms newer than bcrypt tend to want to allocate and scribble all over a large (tens of megabytes at a minimum) block of memory, to make brute force hard in a way that GPUs and ASICs can't easily accelerate. The existing API cannot handle this for three reasons: * `crypt_gensalt` only takes a single cost parameter, some algorithms have several * With everything except `crypt_ra`, all of the memory is allocated by the caller and there's no way for algorithms to say how much they need * There is no destructor function, even with `crypt_ra` - callers just pass the block to `free` So we need to invent a new API that allows for more variety in cost parameters and allocations. It could also make the "all the sensitive data, including stack scratch, is in crypt_data which we auto-erase" feature more robust by adding guard bands and calling mlock(). * Additional hashes to investigate adding: * scrypt <https://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html> * Argon2 <https://password-hashing.net/> * ...? * Support for "pepper" (an additional piece of information, _not_ stored in the password file, that you need to check a password) * Reading passphrases from the terminal is finicky and there are several competing, poorly portable, questionably sound library functions to do it (`getpass`, `readpassphrase`, etc) -- should we incorporate one? * If we do, should it know how to trigger the trusted-path password prompt in modern GUI environments? (probably)
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